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How Corrupt Are Universities? Audit Culture,
Fraud Prevention, and the Big Four
Accountancy Firms
by Cris Shore
Corruption narratives, like witchcraft accusations, offer a lens for analyzing social relations, economic interests, and
hidden structures of power. Developing this theme, I examine discourses of corruption in the context of growing
concerns about fraud prevention and anti-corruption in universities. Moving beyond critiques of university admin-
istrations as bureaucratic, self-serving entities whose interests are increasingly antithetical to the academic mission of
the university, I ask,What is corruption in academia and how does this assumed problem relate to academic capitalism
and the rise of audit culture? The empirical context formy study is the extraordinary increase in institutionalized fraud-
prevention programs, particularly those offered by the “Big Four” accountancy ﬁrms. Taking as my case study the
introduction of a whistle-blower hotline at one Australasian university, I examine the politics and interests behind such
schemes. The increasing involvement of accountancy ﬁrms in nonauditing work, including anti-corruption services,
illustrates how corruption narratives operate as market-making strategies. I examine how commercialization, risk
management, and auditing proliferate anti-corruption initiatives and how audit ﬁrms collude in the risk and corrup-
tion that they claim to ameliorate. I conclude by assessing the implications for the anthropology of corruption of the
growing penetration of universities by an increasingly commercially focused tax industry that, some argue, cannot even
be trusted to regulate itself.
Neoliberalized Universities and the Growth
of Corruption
Over the past decade, concerns about rising corruption have
spread to one of the world’s oldest and most hallowed insti-
tutions: the university. However, given the difﬁculties of studying
corruption, let alone measuring it, the question of how corrupt
universities are is not one we can answer with any accuracy. As
Philip Altbach (2015:7) observes, despite the plethora of indi-
cators for measuring and ranking universities by the quality of
their research and teaching, credit ratings, reputation, and other
factors—such as impact, innovation, graduate employability,
and the student experience—“no one has developed a world-
wide academic corruption index.” Not yet, at least. Rather than
assessing whether universities are becoming more corrupt or
what indicators might serve to measure and corroborate such
claims, I use these questions to interrogate two broader con-
ceptual issues. The ﬁrst is the “performativity” of the word cor-
ruption, or how it is put towork, particularly given the difﬁculties
of deﬁning what constitutes corruption in academia. My use of
the term performativity draws on the idea of “speech acts”
developed by anthropologists and philosophers of language
(Austin 1962; Butler 1997; Turner 1988), who argue that the
work of speech and communication is not simply to commu-
nicate but also to consummate action. In this sense, narratives
about university corruption work to legitimize forms of action,
empower certain individuals—typically accountants, risk man-
agers, and anti-corruption experts—and bring particular kinds
of social reality into being. This is also what Ian Hacking (2002:
108) termed “dynamic nominalism”; the way social classiﬁca-
tions create new categories of problem and subjectivity.
The second issue concerns the major changes in the orga-
nization of universities over the past two decades as a result of
successive waves of neoliberal reform that most Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) coun-
tries have implemented over that time and the problems that
these changes raise for combating corruption. These reforms
have resulted in a growing marketization of the university and
have introduced a raft of new forms of accountability and
control based on principles of ﬁnancial accountancy and new
public management. Their initial aim was to introduce eco-
nomic and administrative efﬁciencies into the governance of
academia, promoting innovation and entrepreneurialism. But
this “enterprise university model” (Marginson and Consadine
2000)—what Slaughter and Leslie (1997) labeled “academic
capitalism”—has produced both new opportunities and new
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cleavages. More important, these changes also reﬂect the rise of
“audit culture” (Power 1997; Strathern 2000). The term audit
culture refers to the way that the techniques, practices, and
rationalities of accountancy have expanded beyond the do-
mains of ﬁnance to become major principles of organization
and instruments of management throughout both public- and
private-sector organizations (Shore and Wright 2015). Audit
culture is an assemblage of different policy processes, account-
ing technologies, andmoral injunctions that exert power through
the normalization and naturalization of particular ways of think-
ing and ﬁnancialized forms of management. In academia, au-
dit culture reaches down from government ofﬁcials, university
leadership teams, and faculty managers to heads of schools, de-
partments, and individual academic staff in ever-more perva-
sive drives to measure and improve staff productivity and per-
formance (Shore 2008; Shore and Wright 1999).
The extent to which academic capitalism has led to in-
creased corruption is debatable. However, two recent reports
by the United Nations (UN) Educational, Scientiﬁc, and Cul-
tural Organization (UNESCO; Hallak and Poisson 2007) and
Transparency International (2013a) argue that corruption in
higher education has become a matter of mounting interna-
tional concern for governments, educators, students, and other
stakeholders. It is also a growing problem in China, where
some have described it as a “cancer” (Yang 2015). Corruption
in universities is not a new phenomenon, but what is new, ac-
cording to Chapman and Lindner (2016:247), is a “unique con-
vergence of pressures that is creating heightened threat to the
integrity of the higher education enterprise worldwide.” Trans-
parency International (2013b) identiﬁes four factors creating
the conditions for corruption to ﬂourish. First, declining public
funding for higher education and the erosion of salaries. Sec-
ond, a corresponding emphasis on universities generating their
own income streams, often by raising tuition fees, increasing
pressure on academics to win external grants and commercialize
the results of their research, or developing for-proﬁt auxiliary
businesses, including real estate speculation. Third, an inten-
siﬁcation of pressures on academics to publish their research
in top-tiered journals as universities seek to raise their national
and international standing and reputation by improving their
position in world university rankings. And ﬁnally, the expec-
tation that universities should generate their own funds has
resulted in institutions being granted far greater administrative
autonomy. To these, we might add a ﬁfth factor: by weakening
state controls and established regulatory practices, neoliberal
policies have opened up “vast extralegal spaces of opportunity
for appropriation and inﬂuence” (Muir 2016:135; see also Co-
maroff and Comaroff 2006). In a climate of budget cuts and
increasing competition for status and resources, these trends
have encouraged more “ﬂexible” approaches to bending the
rules and interpreting what constitutes acceptable practice
(Chapman and Lindner 2016:47). As Heyneman observes:
Competition for resources, fame and notoriety place extraor-
dinary pressures on higher education institutions. The
weaker ones, those with an absence of control or managerial
strength, are most prone to corruption. In some instances,
corruption has invaded whole systems of higher education
and threatens the reputation of research products and
graduates regardless of their guilt or innocence. (Heyneman
2013:101)
According to the director of UNESCO’s International In-
stitute for Education, academic fraud has become so wide-
spread that it now poses a “serious threat” to public trust in
educational institutions and performance and to the “integrity
and reliability of certiﬁcation of higher education” (Hallak and
Poisson 2007:3).
In this article, I consider these pressures and reﬂect on how
debates about corruption in higher education are being framed.
I also question the assumptions about the causes of corruption,
including the oft-repeated argument that “the roots of corrupt
practices lie in a lack of transparency and accountability” or the
absence of “strong management” (Transparency International
2013b:xiii). Moving beyond questions of how corrupt universi-
ties are, I examine the interests behind efforts to combat cor-
ruption in academia. Discourses about the dangers that cor-
ruption poses to public trust in universities, I argue, are both
instrumental and performative, not only serving internal man-
agerial agendas but also creating ways to open universities up to
external ﬁnancial interests and for-proﬁt service providers.
Paradoxically, many of the problems that the Transparency In-
ternational nongovernmental organization and anti-corruption
agencies identify, including procurement fraud and collusion,
are often exacerbated by the very agencies employed to combat
such practices. If the same logics that fuel corruption are also
driving anti-corruption programs, where does this leave the
future of the university?
My argument is set out in four parts. First, following brief
remarks about anthropological approaches to corruption, I
take up Roscigno’s provocative idea of looking at university ad-
ministration as a new form of organized crime (2015). While
Roscigno’s comparisons are largely rhetorical, I suggest that they
nevertheless highlight signiﬁcant trends arising from the in-
creasing power that has accrued to university managers and
senior administrators. These trends illustrate how risk and
audit have become prevalent themes in university governance,
replacing previous notions of public management and pro-
fessional integrity. I also consider the question of deﬁning cor-
ruption in the university context and reﬂect brieﬂy on different
varieties of academic corruption. Second, drawing on ﬁeldwork
in New Zealand, I describe one university’s attempts to combat
corruption by introducing a whistle-blower hotline. Tracing the
history of this and similar initiatives across Australasia, I ask
what drives these programs and what they reveal about the ef-
fects of corruption narratives. As I illustrate, the “Big Four” ac-
countancy ﬁrms play an increasingly dominant role in the bur-
geoning anti-corruption services market—a market that these
ﬁrms themselves have helped to create. However, as the third
section shows, these ﬁrms have lamentable records in terms of
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their own involvement with fraud, raising serious questions
about collusion and conﬂicts of interest. Finally, I conclude by
considering the effect of increasing university commerciali-
zation and institutionalized antifraud initiatives and what this
reveals about audit culture’s impact on the university’s mis-
sion.
Anthropology, Corruption, and Anti-corruption
Anthropological approaches to the study of corruption have
typically highlighted two important methodological points.
The ﬁrst is that corruption is neither a stable nor a universal
category and that its meanings, and the behaviors that people
call “corrupt,” vary cross-culturally. Thismakes corruption hard
to deﬁne and harder still to measure or compare. Transparency
International’s highly inﬂuential Corruption Perceptions Index
is not objective but subjective: what it measures are simply the
impressions (“perceptions”) of individuals and experts around
the world that Transparency International selects for its survey
(Whyte 2015:4).Moreover, public perceptions about corruption
in particular countries are themselves often shaped by Trans-
parency International’s own Corruption Perceptions Index in a
self-reinforcing feedback loop. Institutional deﬁnitions of cor-
ruption are therefore often both narrowly focused and ethno-
centric. This is particularly evident in the World Bank’s (1997)
deﬁnition of corruption as “the abuse of public ofﬁce for private
gain.”1 Every way of seeing is also a way of not seeing, and this
deﬁnition, by conﬁning corruption to the public sector, effec-
tively rules out corruption as a problem for the private sector,
which has signiﬁcant implications when it comes to institu-
tionalizing anti-corruption initiatives.
The second point is that discourses about corruption and
its solution provide a useful anthropological lens for analyzing
wider social structures and cultural relations. Like witchcraft
accusations, corruption narratives reveal a great deal about
social tensions and the normative order of a society: what it
considers ethical/unethical, moral/immoral, or legal/illegal (Haller
and Shore 2005; Muir 2016). Social norms become most visible
in moments of transgression, or as Parkin (1985) noted in The
Anthropology of Evil, morality is most clearly seen in its trans-
gression.2 In this respect, and to paraphrase Lévi-Strauss, cor-
ruption is “good to think with”: while the analysis of corruption
may not produce any deﬁnitive answers or solutions, like myth,
it can reveal some of the fundamental dilemmas and contra-
dictions that underlie any social system.
“University Bureaucracy as Organized Crime”:
Administrative Capture and Institutionalized
Rent Seeking
One inspiration for this article was a polemical article in the
journal CounterPunch titled “University Bureaucracy as Or-
ganized Crime,” written by Vincent Roscigno (2015), a pro-
fessor of Sociology at Ohio State University. Roscigno engages
in what he calls a “sociological thought experiment” to ask
whether the “administrative bloating of public universities and
the harm it has caused (is) akin to organized crime.”Admitting
that this seems far-fetched, he points out four troubling yet
intriguing similarities:
1. the hierarchical, bureaucratic, and coordinated struc-
ture of both;
2. the accruing of riches at the top among a bloated cadre of
high-level senior managers who sometimes set their own
reward structures with little constraint or accountability
to faculty or their increasingly indebted students, and who
abide by the logic that higher education is but a commodity
to be sold to customers through eye-candy, window-dressing
investments in buildings, cafeterias, sports grounds, and
high-visibility athletics programs;
3. the way both require explicit or tacit governmental sup-
port from politicians whose policies are complicit in
creating these changed circumstances; and
4. the extraction of income from—and ultimate harm
done to—well-intentioned families, adjunct lecturers,
and the intellectual mission of public higher education.
These processes, he concludes, ultimately erode the intellec-
tual and engagement goals on which higher education was
founded. Indeed, in lieu of hiring new faculty to replace retiring
faculty or building on intellectual strengths, the university bu-
reaucrat’s solution to budgetary issues now centers, more often
than not, on the hiring of those in research areas ﬂushwith grant
money—of which universities want a sizeable cut (Lewis and
Shore 2017)—or cheaper and all-the-more-exploitable adjunct
lecturers, who typically hold PhDs but are underpaid, have
limited beneﬁts, and receive only temporary contracts.
This is not “corruption” as conventionally understood (i.e.,
bribery, embezzlement, deliberate deception, fraud, or abuse
of public ofﬁce), and yet there are similarities (what Witt-
genstein might term “family resemblances”) with organized
crime. Foremost among these is the “personal ﬁnancial wind-
fall for university presidents, provosts, and executive deans—
a professional class of non-teaching personnel to whom the
rewards and power of today’s university bureaucracies in-
creasingly accrue” (Roscigno 2015; see also Shore and Wright
2017). Another point of comparison is the emphasis placed
on capturing rents and the ruthless breaking up of higher
education to release its revenue-making potential: that is,
these processes all entail opening up universities so that busi-
ness and commercial interests can appropriate their assets—
1. This ﬂawed and partial deﬁnition is echoed by Hallak and Poisson
(2007:29): “Corruption in the education sector can be deﬁned as ‘the
systematic use of public ofﬁce for private beneﬁt.’ ” In the post-Enron era,
however, some organizations, including Transparency International, have
expanded the deﬁnition to include the “abuse of entrusted power”—and
an entrusted power could include private as well as public organizations.
2. See also Parkin’s commentary on Csordas’s essay on “Morality as a
Culture System,” where he writes, “If you want to study happiness, then
start with misery. Similarly, the entry points for a study of morality are
its negative aspects” (Csordas et al. 2013:538).
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what Barber, Donnelly, and Rizvi (2013) call “unbundling” the
university.
Many academics would view such practices—including uni-
versity administrations taking a large percentage of research
grants to cover “overheads” or allowing conﬁdentiality agree-
ments on industry-sponsored research—as forms of corruption
insofar as they constitute abuse of the purposes for which those
funds were intended. The point, however, is that most of the
policies and practices associated with university commerciali-
zation conveniently sidestep the deﬁnitional issue of what
constitutes corruption; that is, technically speaking, such ac-
tions cannot be corruption proper (“abuse of public ofﬁce for
private gain”) because the public-private distinction is blurred.
Just as universities have become repositioned as transnational
business corporations operating in a competitive global knowl-
edge economy (Wright and Shore 2017), many British, Aus-
tralian, and New Zealand universities now set individual ﬁnan-
cial performance targets for external grant revenue that each
academic is expected to raise as part of their job description
(Grove 2015). Academic entrepreneurship that generates new
income streams for the university has not only become a con-
tractual duty; university managers now increasingly deﬁne pri-
vate or commercial funding as a “public good” (Amsler and
Shore 2015).
Varieties of Corruption in Higher Education
Corruption in higher educationmanifests itself in numerous
forms including bribery, embezzlement, fraud, extortion,
favoritism, nepotism, cronyism, ghost teachers, unautho-
rised tutoring, unfair promotions, misuse of public property,
research misconduct, cheating, and plagiarism. (Osipian
2009:183)
While the risks of corruption in universities may appear ob-
vious, its complex manifestations make deﬁnitions prob-
lematic, as Osipian (2009) suggests. Certainly universities are
prone to fraud and corruption. In the 1980s, I worked in an
Italian university and experienced directly Italy’s entrenched
system of clientelism, or raccommandazione (Zinn 2001), and
the scams and ingenious practices that people deploy to by-
pass bureaucratic hurdles. Cheating and rorting, I discovered,
were considered the norm (Shore 1989).3 The market rates for
writing and translating someone else’s thesis or sitting their
examination were virtually public knowledge. Giving public-
sector jobs to relatives, clients, or supporters was so pervasive
that it hardly registered as illegal or immoral (Day 2011). But
what I found particularly pervasive was a different kind of
corruption, one based on institutionalized forms of clientelism
in hiring, promotions, and assignments, and a division of spoils
along party-political lines, or what was termed lottizzazione
(Perotti 2008).
These practices, hardly unique to Italy, appear to be equally
widespread in Russia, the Ukraine, and other former Soviet
states (Osipian 2008, 2009), albeit in a slightly different form.
However, to the best of my knowledge, endemic nepotism,
family ﬁefdoms, and a sophisticated market in the sale of PhD
dissertations are not problems that trouble New Zealand or its
university system—although here, too, the politics of bicul-
turalism and the growing emphasis on commercialization of-
ten result in university jobs being awarded in ways that are
sometimes far from fair or transparent (Lewis and Shore 2017).
Combating Fraud in the University:
An Antipodean Case Study
Rather than tackling the ontological question of “what is” uni-
versity corruption or measuring whether it is increasing, I want
to take a different angle by asking why universities have become
so concerned with combating fraud and corruption and what
lessons these anti-corruption initiatives offer for the anthro-
pology of corruption. To address these questions, I draw on an
ethnographic vignette from one of New Zealand’s leading uni-
versities.
One Wednesday morning, in June 2010, I opened my uni-
versity mailbox to ﬁnd a curious object sent to me—and to all
staff—by what I assumed was the university’s human resources
or communications ofﬁce: a three-sided cardboard pyramid,
each side displaying a message from the university senior lead-
ership team about some recently launched initiative (ﬁg. 1). On
one side was a photograph of cigarette smoke curling sinuously
from an ashtray against a black background, on top of which was
written, in bold white capitals: “No Butts About It—Smoke Free
Campuses.” This also announced, for those who wished to kick
the habit, that help was available through the university’s
“Quitline.”The second side, this time in softer, lowercase green
lettering, was an announcement about the university’s new
sustainability and environment policy and website:
Did You Know? In 2009, our university used 44% less en-
ergy and 73% less water per student than 30 years ago.
Please help us keep improving.
• Turn off all unnecessary lights
• Report all leaks and dripping taps
It also encouraged staff to seek further information from the
university’s sustainability and environment portal.4
The third side of the pyramid showed aman in a suit speaking
into a mobile telephone, over which was written, in red and
white, “FairCall” and “Let’s protect our University.” Full of
imperatives and injunctions, this announced a new antifraud
3. “Rort” is a term common in Australia and New Zealand that means
to engage in fraudulent and dishonest acts, or sharp practices, while re-
maining within the letter of the law.
4. Somewhat controversially, the vice chancellor later dismissed as
contrary to the interests of the university a campaign led by academics
and students that sought to implement a policy of university disinvest-
ment in fossil fuel companies.
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and anti-corruption initiative, asserting that, “As staff of The
University of Auckland we are committed to protecting the
reputation of our university. If you suspect a staff member of
defrauding the university, or of engaging in unethical behav-
iour, please make a good call. Contact KPMG FairCall on 0800
100 526. Our independent experts will provide you with sup-
port.”
Why had Auckland University launched this new antifraud
hotline? What was the context behind this initiative? Had the
university suddenly become more exposed to corruption? And
why was the telephone hotline being directed by KPMG—an
international accountancy ﬁrm not particularly recognized for
its expertise in either anti-corruption or higher education? I
decided to investigate.
Measuring Fraud or Market Making?
Tracking through the archives, I found a Radio New Zealand
Newswire press release dated February 15, 2010, announcing
that “the accounting ﬁrm KPMG says fraud in New Zealand
has risen to record levels.” Fraud in New Zealand, it added,
“amounted to 100-million dollars in 2009, with a dramatic
surge in the second half of the year” (Thompson 2010). Further
news reports in the Independent Financial Review and Fairfax
Media highlighted more alarming ﬁgures:
Fraud soared in the second half of 2009, boosting the amount
defrauded for the year to $100m, but the worst is yet to come,
KPMG says. In the six months to December, $76m was de-
frauded compared with $22 in the ﬁrst half of the year, ac-
cording to KPMG’s large-scale fraud survey. . . . KPMG
forensics partner Mark Leishman said the jump in the second
half of last year was due to several multimillion dollar cases.
Businesses had kept a closer eye on their books, meaning
fraud was more likely to be detected. (Independent Financial
Review 2010)
For a country that prides itself on its reputation for being one
of the world’s least corrupt and most transparent countries,
these ﬁgures are worrying. The only mitigating factor was that
the high levels of fraud, most of which had been perpetrated
against the government, ﬁnancial institutions, and commercial
businesses, had been uncovered during the 2008 global ﬁnan-
cial crisis and therefore reﬂected preexisting frauds. However,
KPMG warned that “these ﬁgures conﬁrm that fraud is a con-
stant and serious threat to all sectors of the New Zealand econ-
omy, including business, governments, non-proﬁt organisa-
tions, and individuals” (Scoop Media 2010). It also warned that
the threat to organizations was as much internal as external. As
the KPMG Fraud andMisconduct Survey 2010 put it, “Who did
it andwhy? Sixty-ﬁve per cent ofmajor frauds are committed by
people already working in the victim organisation, who usually
act alone” (KPMG 2010:3).
As if to corroborate this, the KPMG “Fraud Barometer,”
released in July 2010, was headlined by Radio New Zealand
National as “Fraud expected to rise to record level.” Yet ac-
cording to KPMG forensic expert Stephen Bell, these ﬁgures
were “only the tip of the iceberg” (McEntee 2010). The lobby
Figure 1. Ofﬁce “desk pyramid” sent to all University of Auckland staff in 2010 announcing three new policies, including the FairCall
whistle-blower hotline. (Photograph by Tim Mackrell.) A color version of this ﬁgure is available online.
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group Business New Zealand (RNZ 2010) echoed the warn-
ing. To monitor these trends, KPMG began publishing the
biannual Fraud Barometer, the ﬁndings of which are based
on reported fraud cases brought before the criminal courts.
These reports drew the same conclusions: fraud was a serious
problem for both public and private sectors, the threat of
fraud was growing, and the main perpetrators were individ-
ual employees—or as one report put it, “98 per cent by value
were ‘inside jobs’” (KPMG 2010:3). The other key message is
that most companies are complacent and do not spend
enough on fraud and corruption prevention or detection.5
The following year, KPMG’s fraud detection activities again
made headline news: “KPMG says more fraudsters are being
caught in New Zealand,” announced a Radio New Zealand
bulletin, noting that KPMG’s 2011 Fraud Barometer had
identiﬁed “20 high value fraud cases in the six months to
December, almost a third more than in the ﬁrst half of the
year” (RNZ 2011). The 2012 Fraud Barometer reported an
even more dramatic increase: ﬁnancial crime had now reached
a record $1.7 billion, $279.7 million of which arose directly
from fraud, including four “super-frauds”—a term used for
frauds greater than $3 million (KPMG 2012a). For KPMG, the
lesson was obvious:
The message from experts, well supported by the results of
this survey, is clear. Tomitigate the risks of fraud, bribery and
corruption, all New Zealand organisations need to plan for,
implement and/or improve their prevention, detection and
response strategies. Seen in this light, the opportunity to offer
a dedicated analysis of the New Zealand experience is thus
timely and important. (KPMG New Zealand 2012)
The same year, Deloitte (2012) commissioned its own Bribery
and Corruption in Australia and New Zealand Survey, men-
acingly subtitled “A Storm on the Horizon.” And in 2014,
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PwC) published its global Economic
Crime Report, subtitled “What you don’t know can hurt you,”
which included a 32-page New Zealand supplement (PwC
2014). The Deloitte report was based on a survey of 390 re-
spondents, most of whom are employees of Australian subsid-
iaries of foreign companies, public sector organizations, and
ﬁnancial organizations involved with compliance, risk, legal,
and internal auditing. Like the KPMG report, it revealed a dra-
matic increase in fraud, warning of more to come and criticizing
Australasian organizations for their complacency. To emphasise
the point, it included a large boxed quote from Nick Peterson of
the New Zealand Serious Fraud Ofﬁce:
It would be easy to sit back and say that New Zealand is the
country perceived to have the least corruption, and that it
only happens to others. However, we are seeing more in-
stances of domestic corruption, such as bribes paid to public
ofﬁcials, and corrupt paymentsmadewithin the private sector.
Organisations need to be awake to the changing environ-
ment as well as the legal and reputational risks and conse-
quences associated with engaging in corrupt practices. (Deloitte
2012:25)
The Deloitte report’s recommendation was that organizations
needed to conduct more regular bribery and risk assessments.
Like the KPMG surveys, Deloitte also framed its report around
metaphors of risk and protection, comparing fraud to a dan-
gerous hurricane (as opposed to a treacherous iceberg), re-
quiring urgent action to protect institutions (and “build re-
sistance to ﬂawed decision making”). And who better to do
that work than professional risk-management accountants at
Deloitte and KPMG?
These texts perfectly illustrate the performativity of corrup-
tion narratives and indicators: before these barometer surveys
and audit reports, company leaders and university managers
rarely considered fraud and corruption as urgent problems. Yet
through these headline-grabbing ﬁndings and dire predictions,
the problem is created for which these audit companies profess
to be the solution. Anti-corruption has shifted from a move-
ment to a lucrative industry (Sampson 2010), and the Big Four
accountancy ﬁrms have been assiduous in cultivating the cli-
mate of risk and anxiety that has helped expand their business
into new markets. Indeed, “anticorruptionism” has become in-
tegral to what Sampson (2016:83) terms “moral capitalism” and
the growing emphasis companies now place on ethics and rep-
utation as valuable company assets.
It is important to note the methodology behind the Deloitte
survey. The survey “was completed by 390 respondents, in-
cluding those fromASZ 200 andNZX 50 companies, Australian
subsidiaries of foreign companies, public sector organisations
and other listed and private companies. . . . The most common
proﬁle of respondent was a male employee within a senior ﬁ-
nancial position” (Deloitte 2012:2).6 In short, these estimates of
ﬁnancial risk are derived primarily from the perceptions of those
whose livelihoods are most closely entangled with risk and ﬁ-
nancial management.
Genealogy of the Whistle-Blower Hotline
How has this apparent surge in fraud impacted on New Zea-
land’s universities? The University of Auckland’s “FairCall”
anti-corruption hotline was initiated in June 2010, 4 months
after the KPMG report had discovered fraud to be a signiﬁcant
and growing economic problem for Australia and New Zea-
land. The report noted that the likelihood of fraud increases
with the size of an organization, an important factor given that
Auckland University employs over 5,000 people and has an
5. It should be noted that fraud is not corruption, technically speaking.
Fraud typically entails false representation, deception, or concealment for
personal pecuniary advantage. Where this develops into corruption is in
situations where ofﬁcials or managers attempt to cover up, protect, or col-
lude with a fraudster. I am grateful to Steven Sampson for highlighting these
distinctions.
6. ASZ 200 and NZX 50 are the main Australian and New Zealand
stock market indexes, respectively.
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operating budget of over $1 billion NZD,making it one of New
Zealand’s largest organizations.
The whistle-blower hotline was in response to the Auditor
General of New Zealand’s (2012) guidelines on measures for
the prevention of fraud. It was also part of the university’s
overall fraud-prevention program, overseen by the university
council’s audit and risk committee. As an internal university
website explains:
Hotlines such as the FairCall service are now a routine part
of fraud prevention programmes in most large public and
private organisations. They are one of the most common
means by which fraud is detected, and often allow that de-
tection to occur earlier than would be possible through
routine checks and controls. Staff might not feel comfortable
reporting their concerns to their immediate manager or a
more senior manager but are able, through the hotline, to
make an anonymous report to KPMG. (UoA 2014)
The rationale for using an external and private company to
oversee this process was purportedly for reasons of conﬁ-
dentiality and trust: “The KPMG FairCall service provides all
University staff with an independently monitored, external
and anonymous service to report any concerns they may have
about behaviour or conduct, which they think might be
fraudulent, deceptive or unethical” (UoA 2014).
The university’s staff website notes that the FairCall hotline
has generated about 10 calls per annum since its inception,
“each of which has been investigated and a report provided to
KPMG to then be shared with the caller” (UoA 2014). For-
tunately, it concludes, investigations to date have not identi-
ﬁed fraudulent activity at the university. However, this is im-
mediately qualiﬁed with a warning that “in several instances, it
has been noted that the University could implement better pro-
cedures and in others, better communication” (UoA 2014). It
ends with advice to whistle-blowers about where to send their
anonymous information and includes a postal address marked
“KPMG Forensic, PO Box H67, Australia Square, Sydney.”
Interestingly, the university’s deﬁnition of corruption is far
more expansive than that of the World Bank or Transparency
International. As its Prevention of Fraud and Corruption Policy
states:
The terms “fraud” and “corruption” are not restricted to mon-
etary or material beneﬁts. Fraud and corruption typically in-
volve a deliberate, dishonest, deceptive and unauthorized act or
omissions causing loss or disadvantage to the University or
resulting in a direct or indirect personal gain or advantage. Cor-
ruption is dishonest activity in which a manager, staff member
or contractor of the University acts contrary to the interests of
the University and abuses his/her position or trust in order to
achieve some personal gain or advantage for him or herself of
for another person or entity. (UoA 2010)
In short, anyone acting dishonestly and “contrary to the
interests of the University” could be liable to accusations of
corruption. As the document notes, under these terms, even
the university itself could be accused of corrupt conduct.
“We’ve been both relieved and pleased,” one senior leader-
ship team member told me, “that we have not had misuse of
the hotline with malicious calls” (personal communication,
2015). However, who constitutes “the University” or what “its”
interests might be are not speciﬁed. Is the university its ac-
ademics, professional staff, alumni, and students or its senate,
library, and academic board? Is it a corporation sole or ag-
gregate? Or is it embodied in the ﬁgures of its vice chancellor
and senior leadership team? In New Zealand, these are issues
of ongoing contestation between academics and management
(Shore and Taitz 2012).
Paradoxically, the preoccupation with risk and reputation
management may actually undermine the aims of the FairCall
policy, as fears about proliferating risk create a climate of
mistrust and bureaucratic closure. For example, in conducting
research for this article, I contacted members of my university’s
Tertiary EducationUnion (TEU) branch by email to askwhether
any colleagues would like to share their experiences of using the
whistle-blower hotline. The following morning, shortly after
9:00 a.m., 12 hours after sending my email, the university’s
research ethics processes team leader (a role I had never heard
of before) emailed to informme that “a staff member forwarded
your email to the Chair of University’s Human Participant
Ethics Committee (UAHPEC) to ask whether my research had
UAHPEC approval.” I was politely informed that formal ethics
approval was required if I wished to solicit information of this
kind. Obtaining UAHPEC approval is an arduous process that
typically involves completing a 30-to-40-page application form
plus numerous appendices (including participant information
sheet, consent forms, and sample questions) and usually re-
quires several attempts—and many months—before approval
is granted. Many of my colleagues saw this as a crude attempt
to shut down my research. One colleague even telephoned me
that evening and warned that I should issue a retraction;
otherwise, I risked laying myself open to disciplinary action.
“They can be pretty vicious if they want to,” he added, drawing
on previous experience. I therefore sent another email to the
TEUmailing list asking colleagues to ignoremy previous email
because I did not have UAHPEC permission to conduct this
enquiry. That second email elicited many more responses,
including several offers from colleagues to speak off the record
about their experiences of fraud, corruption, nepotism, and
bullying. One of the reviewers for this article suggested that I
make this incident the central theme of this article. As they
summed up the story, “Academics whose skill set it is to in-
terview and ferret ﬁnd it very difﬁcult to do so, even on their
own turf. This tells us a lot about why transparency for most of
us, no matter what our subject position, is an illusion. Cor-
porate entities in the age of neoliberalism generate, as a matter
of routine, opacity.”
Such opacity combined with mistrust leads precisely to the
conspiratorial mind-sets that are integral to the corruption/
anti-corruption complex that Muir and Gupta (2018) outline
in the introduction to this special issue of Current Anthro-
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pology. However, while these themes of organizational trans-
parency and trust feature prominently in debates about audit
culture and academia (Strathern 2000), my story has a dif-
ferent analytical intent: to understand what drives these pre-
occupations with combating corruption. To my surprise, one
of the university’s senior leadership team came to my aid by
putting me in contact with the university’s Performance and
Risk Coordination Ofﬁce and KPMG Australia. I therefore
interviewed several Australian and New Zealand forensic
accountants and risk management ofﬁcials. What I discovered
was that most whistle-blower calls were not about accounting
irregularities or misappropriation of funds; rather, they con-
cerned bullying and harassment of staff and students (see
KPMG Australia 2016b). One could interpret this as evidence
of the decline in university collegiality, or as evidence that
people are now more likely to report workplace bullying, or
perhaps both.
Why This Heightened Concern with Corruption?
Why Now? What Has Changed?
A key claim KPMG and Deloitte make is that New Zealand has
been complacent about fraud protection. Historically, bribery
and corruption were not high on the agenda for Australian and
New Zealand organizations. What has changed, however, is the
international and institutional context. As Deloitte’s report
notes (2012:1), Australian and New Zealand organizations have
become increasingly exposed to risks of fraud and bribery as
they look overseas for new business and growth opportunities.
The environment of austerity and economic volatility created by
the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis is another factor. As New Zealand’s
Auditor General (2012:9) acknowledges, “risk of fraud increases
when many people struggle to make ends meet. Experience
internationally generally conﬁrms a greater incidence of fraud in
recessionary economic climates, with fraud increasing because
of ‘need’ rather than greed.” As I illustrate below, this is a very
different explanation for the causes of fraud than that given in
the KPMG and Deloitte reports.
Other contextualizing factors include more stringent applica-
tion of anti–bribery and corruption legislation, such as the UK
Bribery Act (2010) and the growing enforcement impact inter-
nationally of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the UN Con-
vention Against Corruption (2005), the UN Convention against
Transnational Organised Crime (2003), and the OECD Conven-
tion on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Ofﬁcials in Inter-
national Business Transactions (revised in 2009). It also includes
the more recently established International Standards Organi-
zation antibribery standard, established by Australia. Both Aus-
tralia’s Federal Police and New Zealand’s Serious Fraud Ofﬁce
have increased their enforcement of anti-corruption legislation,
partly in response to the US “war on terror” and to fears about
trafﬁcking andmoney laundering for purposes of terrorism.7
However, neither KPMG, nor Deloitte, nor PwC draws any
links between increasing corruption and the policies and
practices associated with the spread of audit culture and neo-
liberalization. By contrast, critical accountants and economists
argue that taking high risks and malpractice in pursuit of
proﬁts in the ﬁnancial sector are a direct consequence of the
“neoliberalist faith in competition, free markets, quest for
private gain and light-touch regulation” (Sikka 2015:3; Stiglitz
2010). Instead, these ﬁrms insist that individual greed, op-
portunity, and lack of internal controls are what drive rising
levels of corruption. KPMG Australia has even produced a
proﬁle of the types of people who commit fraud. The “typical
fraudster,” it asserts, “is between 36 and 55,” “predominantly
male,” holds an “executive or director-level position,” is “au-
tocratic” yet “well-respected in their organization” and “likely
to be regarded as friendly,” and is “motivated by personal gain”
and the sense of “because I can” (KPMG 2016a; see also PwC
2014a).While their data can, no doubt, corroborate these claims,
the emphasis on individual and psychological factors masks the
wider structural and systemic issues. In the case of universities,
the increasing exposure to risk is itself often a result of the
ﬁnancialization of higher education and increased levels of in-
debtedness as universities borrow to fund new building pro-
grams. As Transparency International (2013a) notes, increas-
ing university fraud is closely linked to decreasing government
investment:
As the global economic crisis heated up over the past few years,
publicmoney for education declined inmany countries, causing
some colleges and universities increasingly to depend on the
generosity of private donors. . . . The very structure and culture
of colleges and universities, as well as the current constraints
under which many . . . operate, can create conditions that
facilitate fraud. (Transparency International 2013a:114)
That said, the massive corruption found in many Eastern Eu-
ropean state-funded universities (Osipian 2009) makes it hard
to sustain the argument that privatization alone is the source of
increased corruption. Transparency International also high-
lights the prevalence of admissions fraud in the former Soviet
states. Ukrainian university administrators have become “in-
ventive in circumventing new admissions rules in order to grant
admission to their protégés,” it claims, while in Russia, “paid
impersonators of students have been arrested in testing centres”
(Parr 2013). There is, however, another aspect of this link be-
tween decreasing public investment, increasing private in-
volvement, risk management, and corruption that is worth
pursuing further: the role of the audit companies themselves.
KPMG and Deloitte: Warriors of Integrity
or Agents of Corruption?
David Whyte (2015) suggests that one reason for the recent
explosion of high-proﬁle corruption scandals in the United
7. As the Australian government’s Attorney-General’s Department
(2016) declares, corruption “undermines democracy and the rule of law,
as well as distorting market forces and paving the way for organised
crime and terrorism.”
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Kingdom—involving some of what were previously the
country’s most trusted institutions, like the National Health
Service, the police, and Parliament—is because the watchdogs
that are supposed to guard against corruption have been fatally
weakened by “the slow and pernicious onward march of a
neoliberal political economy” (Whyte 2015:5; see also Sikka
2014). The same international institutions that demand the re-
moval of protective economic policies to encourage privatiza-
tion and “market reform,” he notes, often drive anti-corruption
policies. Indeed, Peter Eigen, one of the founders of Trans-
parency International, previously worked for the World Bank,
and Transparency International maintains a close relationship
with the bank today.
The Big Four international accountancy ﬁrms often portray
themselves as professionals dedicated to probity and honesty,
“integrity warriors” engaged in the global ﬁght against fraud and
corruption (Sampson 2005:105). But they also have a vested
interest in promoting the market in the anti-corruption services
that they provide. These ﬁrms, as Sikka (2015:157) observes,
were “key players in establishing the post-1970s hegemony and
major beneﬁciaries of the ﬁnancialization of the economy. They
have become adept at bending the rules to advance their eco-
nomic interests.” In short, these companies are part of the
problem for which they claim to be the solution.
Between them, the Big Four employ over 750,000 staff, op-
erate across 150 countries, and, in 2014 alone, generated a
massive $113.7 billion in revenues (Doherty 2014). These ﬁrms
dominate the market in company auditing, yet what is striking
today is that their fastest-growing divisions are currently in ser-
vices other than auditing. Indeed, nonaudit work now accounts
for over 60%of the Big Four’s total global revenues. This involves
a raft of legal, ﬁnancial, and management services that include
risk assessment, ethics and compliance, business consulting,
planning, tax advice, superannuation, insurance, and even cli-
mate change and sustainability (KPMG 2016). As a result, one
part of these ﬁrms might be auditing a company’s books while
another part provides the same client with tax avoidance advice
that may include lucrative tax shelters in unregulated tax havens
such as Panama, Luxembourg, or the Caribbean Islands. Ernst
and Young and KPMG (but not Deloitte) responded by dis-
posing of their consulting arms. However, by the mid-2000s, as
Agnew (2015) notes, “these agreements had expired, paving the
way for the ﬁrms to rebuild in consulting—under the guise of
‘advisory’ work—through a series of acquisitions.”
As a result of these acquisitions and growth, the Big Four
have pioneered a new hybrid form of business entity that is
neither a multinational corporation nor a global partnership,
nor even a single ﬁrm. Their role, instead, is to act as “co-
ordinating entities” for their network of global afﬁliates that
are uniﬁed around a brand and that adhere to shared values
and ethics and a common code of conduct (Ernst and Young
2013; KPMG 2012b). This new business model was designed
to make the ﬁrms more ﬂexible and responsive to their glob-
alizing clients and better equipped to capture new markets.
However, it has also made themmore vulnerable to conﬂicts of
interest, dangerous risk taking, and fraud, as evidenced in the
extraordinary number of scandals involving Big Four auditors
in cases of fraud, false accounting, manipulation of share value,
and tax evasion. Hence, Sikka (2015:158) notes that “an in-
ternal report by HerMajesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC)
in 2005 concluded that the Big Four accounting ﬁrms were
behind almost half of all known avoidance schemes.” Little
seems to have changed since then, and as the House of Com-
mons Committee of Public Accounts (2015:3) noted in a recent
report, the mass marketing of complex and aggressive tax
avoidance schemes by these ﬁrms constitutes “the promotion of
tax avoidance on an industrial scale.”
For example, KPMG failed to warn directors of the Canadian
company Hollinger about violations of ﬁduciary standards that
investigators described as “corporate kleptocracy.”Between 1997
and 2003, Lord Conrad Black, its founder, managed to syphon
off a staggering $400 million before he was detected. This was
more than 95% of Hollinger’s adjusted net income (Coffee
2005:207). In Australia, KPMG and Deloitte were both sued by
theNorthernTerritories SupremeCourt for undisclosedmillions
for failing to detect the theft of millions of dollars by trustees of
an Australian Aboriginal land trust whose accounts they audited
(Wild 2014). And in the United States, a Senate subcommittee
found that KPMG, PwC, and Earnst and Young had all sold
fraudulent and illegal tax shelters to help wealthy clients avoid
$2.5 billion in taxes. KPMG admitted “criminal wrongdoing” to
the Department of Justice and was ﬁned $456 million. However,
the proceedings revealed that a senior KPMG professional had
urged the ﬁrm to ignore internal revenue service rules on reg-
istering tax shelters. “He coldly calculated that the penalties for
violating the law would be no greater than $14,000 per $100,000
in fees that KPMG would collect. ‘For example’, he wrote, ‘our
average . . . deal would result in KPMG fees of $360,000 with a
maximum penalty exposure of only $31,000’ ” (Hudson, Chav-
kin, and Mos 2014).
Such scandals have not dentedKPMG’s conﬁdence in its own
ethical probity and in the high standards of ethical conduct that
it claims to require from its staff, as stated in its Global Code of
Conduct (KPMG 2012b). Yet far from being anomalous, such
calculations are central to the instrumental rationality of audit
culture and the collusion that it produces. In some respects, this
echoes Muir’s observation about the moral ambiguity that
surrounds corruption in Argentina; “people disavowed corrup-
tion in the same breath as they voiced their complicity with it”
(Muir 2016:132). The growing entanglement of the Big Four in
the business of universities creates new kinds of risk and com-
plicity, and the evident conﬂicts of interest do not seem to deter
university managers from seeking these ﬁrms’ services in fraud
prevention and anti-corruption.
Conclusions: Performativity of Fraud
and Anti-corruption
These stories highlight both the ﬁnancial logics and conﬂicts
of interest at play in the activities of the Big Four accountancy
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ﬁrms. They also show how these ﬁrms collude in the risk and
corruption that they claim to ameliorate, a process that illustrates
themarket-making potential of anti-corruption discourses: audit
ﬁrms produce reports highlighting the dangers of fraud, for
which they profess to offer the solution—to their fee-paying
clients. As Sampson (2010) argues, this “anti-corruption indus-
try” is both a growing transnational business and a “world” in the
anthropological sense (Sampson 2005:110). It also reﬂects what
Wedel (2009:51) terms the “dirty togetherness” of collision and
collusion between individuals and corporate networks that op-
erate in the gray zones and revolving doors between the private
and public spheres. Universities should therefore be wary of
contracting these commercial audit ﬁrms to run their services.
This is not to trivialize the problem of corruption in universities
or elsewhere but rather to interrogate the discourse of risk
management, with its metaphors of icebergs and storms on the
horizon, and ask whether these large accountancy ﬁrms are
sufﬁciently independent to provide the necessary watchdog and
guardian function to protect organizations against fraud and
corruption. As the House of Commons Committee of Public
Accounts (2015:6) concluded, the tax industry “has demon-
strated very clearly that it cannot be trusted to regulate itself.”
The stories also highlight two other points of wider rele-
vance to debates about corruption and its remedy. The ﬁrst
concerns issues of ethics and morality. Expert opinion holds
that corruption and fraud prevention are cultural and behav-
ioral issues rather than systemic problems. As the UNESCO
report concluded, the solution to fraud and corruption lies in
enhancing “ethical education,” “maintaining transparent reg-
ulatory systems,” and “strengthening management capacities
for greater accountability”—all of which will help to build a
“virtuous triangle” (Hallack and Poisson 2007:21). However, in
the case of KPMG US, corporate fraud and assisting clients
with tax avoidance was not so much about morality as it was a
simple business calculation (which, one could argue, is simply
a different kind of economic morality). The issue for KPMG
was not about ethics but about how much they could get away
with without being caught and a calculation of the costs of
being ﬁned.
The second point concerns theories about the causes of cor-
ruption. The commonsense argument is that the root of cor-
ruption is individual avarice.AsColin Ferguson (2012:47) states,
“simple greed and the opportunity to live beyond one’s normal
lifestyle are the primary motivations for fraud.” This is some-
times framed as “good people doing bad things,” an argument
that lends support to calls for better training and guidance,
which KPMG or Deloitte will provide. The examples in this
paper tell a different story. They show that fraud and corruption
are largely systemic and structural problems and that these
have increased with the growing ﬁnancialization and auditing
of higher education. Strengthening management and subjec-
ting universities to numerical performance targets and ever-
greater scrutiny and interventions by external assessors and
auditors does not foster greater transparency or more ethical
behavior. Indeed, these may produce the opposite effect by
creating opacity, incentivizing more risky behavior, under-
mining collegiality, and promoting a regress of mistrust.
Substituting (or “supplementing”) professional trust and
collegiality with systems of audit is typically seen as a more
rigorous and effective way to prevent corruption and promote
ethical probity. This view is epitomized by New Zealand’s
Controller and Auditor General, Lyn Provost: “It is also im-
portant to remember that trusting staff is not a fraud control.
Systems do not commit fraud, people do. Public entities need
to ensure that they have the right systems in place” (Auditor
General of New Zealand 2012:3).
This statement recalls the argument, often used by the US
National Riﬂe Association, that “guns don’t kill people, people
kill people.” The ﬂaw in this reasoning is that it is systems that
create the conditions of possibility and incentives for corrup-
tion. By blurring the distinction between public and private
and encouraging the increasing incursion of private wealth
accumulation into the public sphere, private audit companies
actively collude in the neoliberal makeover of universities.
Moreover, substituting professional judgment with auditing
technologies tends to have a corrosive effect on relations of
trust, particularly in the public sector, as O’Neill (2002) has
argued. This kind of approach unwittingly destroys the very
idea of the university itself as a place of disinterested schol-
arship and teaching, which has traditionally always relied on
ideas of collegiality, professionalism, and trust.
This invites the question, why did Auckland University’s
Audit and Finance Committee contract out the administra-
tion of its fraud prevention program to KPMG Australia
rather than deal with it in-house or with professionals who
were not tied to the management and accounting industry—
such as Transparency International’s long-standing Advocacy
and Legal Advice Centres?8 Might it have had something to
do with the composition of that committee, the fact that the
chairman of the university’s council was an accountant, or
that the university’s internal control environment is regularly
audited by its internal auditors, PwC? At least the contract
was not outsourced to PwC, which might have been con-
sidered inappropriate. According to one informant, “the uni-
versity went out to a limited tender, and KPMG was selected
from amongst the various proposals.” Coincidentally, one of
the council members had been a partner for KPMG for 30 years
and chair and chief executive of KPMG New Zealand from
2008 to 2011.
This brings us back to the anthropological point I began
with about the wider deﬁnition and meaning of corruption and
the way that privatization and the growing inﬂuence of com-
mercial interests are changing (and corrupting) the meaning
and mission of the university. Paradoxically, the institution-
alization of antifraud programs is fuelling that process.
8. Transparency International’s Advocacy and Legal Advice Centres
have been providing free and conﬁdential legal advice to witnesses and
victims of corruption since 2003 (Transparency International 2016).
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Finally, it is important to note that no deﬁnition of fraud
actually exists in the criminal code in Australia. The Australian
Fraud and Corruption Control standard deﬁnes fraud as:
dishonest activity causing actual or potential ﬁnancial loss
to any person or entity including theft of money or other
property by employees or persons external to the entity and
whether or not deception is used at the time. . . . This also
includes deliberate falsiﬁcation, concealment, destruction or
use of falsiﬁed document used or intended for use for a
normal business purpose or the improper use of informa-
tion or position.9 (Ferguson 2012:48)
This is an extraordinarily broad deﬁnition and one that could
also encompass activities and behaviors routinely performed
by university vice chancellors and senior management teams,
particularly in their dealings with academics or negotiations
with staff unions. Indeed, tertiary education union members
regularly spoke about management’s tactical use of conceal-
ment, falsiﬁcation of the facts, and improper use of informa-
tion during the industrial disputes between 2010 and 2013
(Shore and Davidson 2014).
The issue of corruption in the university is therefore perhaps
less problematic than the corruption of the university, par-
ticularly as this relates to the increasing capture of its assets by
predatory ﬁnancial interests and for-proﬁt companies. Ro-
signo’s polemic about university bureaucracy as organized
crime may, in fact, be quite prescient: the harm to universities
as a result of increasing extraction of income from parents and
students, the endless reforms to transform universities into
simulacra of the transnational business corporation, and the
continuous administrative and managerial bloat certainly
provide a broader perspective for thinking about the anthro-
pology of corruption. If corruption is a “category of trans-
gression,” as Muir and Gupta (2018) note, then what we need
are new concepts and methods to better understand what trans-
gression means in a university and academic context. We used
to think of corruption as the abuse of ofﬁce or use of power for
personal private gain, but the blurring of the boundaries be-
tween the public and private sectors and the revolving door
between ﬁnance, accountancy, and the governing boards of
public organizations has elided the distinction that once insu-
lated the public sector from the predatory interests and logics of
ﬁnance capitalism. I have singled out the role of the Big Four
accounting ﬁrms as key agents in this boundary-eroding work,
but they are not alone. Audit culture and the corruption po-
tential it generates are part of a much larger complex of lean and
mean organizations, the tasks that they are required to perform,
the pressures that they are under, and the way they are managed.
Not even the Big Four are safe from audit culture and its ra-
tionale. After all, it was not so long ago that the Big Four were
the Big Eight, then the Big Five. And the king of them all,
Arthur Anderson, fell from grace in a way that no one, least
of all the big accounting ﬁrms, expected.
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